Introduction: Postwar Japan's Drift and Double Composition
American politics in the 1930s was symbolized by the conflict between the New Dealers and Wall Street. Under the F. Roosevelt administration, the New Dealers sought social reform and challenged the vested interests of financial capital, but Wall Street ostracized them, leaving them with no place to live. Defeated Japan became the "testing ground" for this, and New Dealers dispatched to the GHQ Civil Affairs Bureau promoted democratization and the establishment of a pacifist constitution. However, with the Cold War in full swing, they were ostracized, and Wall Street became the director of postwar Japan.
This structure was transplanted into postwar Japanese politics, forming a dual structure between the conservative mainstream of the Kōchikai, which originated with Yoshida Shigeru, and the fringe of the Seiwakai, which originated with Kishi Nobusuke. This brings to mind Otsuka Hisao's words about the struggle between "communal norms" and "modern rationality ." Japan's modernization was inevitably delayed due to the strength of communal norms, and this delay led to the drift of postwar politics.
As we approach the 80th anniversary of the end of the war, there is still no prospect of ending the postwar era. The era in which we enjoyed the fruits of economic growth is over, and politics remains entangled in a dual conflict with no way out in sight.
■The Kochikai Resistance and the Peace Constitution
The Kōchikai advocated "light armament and economic priority," and, backed by the heartbreaking voices of war veterans saying, "Never again will there be war," the party pursued a course of protecting the pacifist constitution. A symbolic example was Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko's visit to the United States in 1981. The Japan-U.S. Joint Communiqué included the term "alliance relationship" for the first time, but Suzuki repeatedly and strongly denied it in his Diet responses, saying, "It has no military significance."
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials ignored Prime Minister Suzuki's wishes and inserted the wording. Furthermore, they did not inform him that they had inserted the phrase "alliance." Ten years later, a secretary to the prime minister (then seconded to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry), who accompanied Suzuki and was watching nearby, testified, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was wary of Suzuki, who was a wartime veteran and had once been a member of the Socialist Party, and suspected he might have doubts about the Security Treaty." This fact blatantly demonstrates how completely subordinated the core of Japan was to the will of the United States.
Suzuki's resistance was the last shining light of Kōchikai pacifism. The "community norms" that Ōtsuka pointed out appeared here as the "ethics of war veterans" and were linked to the defense of a peace constitution based on modern rationality. In a 1981 House of Representatives Budget Committee meeting, Suzuki clearly stated, "Japan will not share a military role that is premised on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense."
The Rise of the Seiwa Kai and Shinzo Abe
Meanwhile, the Seiwa Kai, following in the footsteps of Kishi Nobusuke, linked up with the CIA and the Unification Church and made the establishment of an independent constitution its ultimate goal. His grandson, Shinzo Abe, achieved an exceptionally rapid rise to the position of prime minister just 13 years after his first election in 1993. Behind the scenes was pressure from the American neoconservatives and Japan handlers.
The Armitage Report presented Japan with a detailed list of demands. The first report, published in 2000, called for Japan to "allow the exercise of the right of collective self-defense," "pass emergency legislation in the Diet," and "integrate the U.S. military and the Self-Defense Forces," while the third report, published in 2012, called for the "enactment of new security legislation." The Abe administration has realized all of these demands, completing a system that integrates the Self-Defense Forces into the U.S. military's global strategy.
What we see here is a "revival of communal norms." Shinzo Abe's political line relies more on communal norms than modern rationality, reviving a political culture that harkens back to prewar times. His rapid rise to power was not the product of a rational system, but rather was supported by a combination of the US neoconservatives' global hegemonic strategy and the power of lineage and association that has ensnared Japan's entrenched conservative base.
■ China threat theory and the promotion of patriotism - a device to manipulate public opinion
The China threat theory was not simply a diplomatic concern, but also functioned as a device to manipulate domestic public opinion. Domestic unrest in China, such as the Tiananmen Square incident, the Uighur independence movement, and the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, has led to allegations that US and British intelligence agencies are involved, reinforcing the impression in Japan that China is an unstable and dangerous nation. Tensions over the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands were criticized as a mistake by the Democratic Party government and provided justification for the Abe administration's "strong Japan" policy.
The Nippon Kaigi's 1997 founding statement stated, "Rebuilding a beautiful Japan and building a proud nation." These words symbolize the revival of communal norms. The glorification of patriotism evoked the prewar Imperial view of history and shook the foundations of postwar democracy. The "Amazing Japan" enthusiasm at sporting venues, the "praise of Japan" on television, and the reinforcement of "morality" in school education all served as psychological devices for reviving communal norms.
This is what Otsuka calls the "delay of modern rationality." Communal norms took precedence over rational institutions, and politics was once again dominated by the power of the community.
■ Anti-China containment and international strategic concept
To reinforce this point, I refer to my blog post, "Japan Spanning Eurasia to Support US Sole Hegemony: No Prospects for the Postwar End" (March 9, 2024), which describes Japan's security environment as follows:
Japan is merely a "defender" for the Anglo-Saxon alliance of the United States and Britain, which seeks to contain Russia and China on the Eurasian continent. After the Cold War, NATO transformed from a defensive organization into a global collective security network with an offensive nature, and Japan, as a de facto member, is at the forefront of efforts to contain China. During the Abe administration, Prime Minister personally visited NATO headquarters in 2007, and in 2017, a Japanese government mission was established. This was considered "de facto membership in NATO," and Japan became part of the US-UK strategy, including support for Ukraine.
In this situation, the Japanese are being treated like "defenders who were once deployed from the eastern provinces to Kyushu in fear of an invasion by the Tang Dynasty." In other words, the China threat theory is not simply a regional concern, but something that has been imposed on Japan as part of the US's unilateral hegemonic strategy, and Japan has been placed on the front lines of international strategy without any independent choice to make.
Conclusion: The end of the Abe faction and the drift of postwar Japan
Shinzo Abe's political line was subordinate to US strategy and aimed to incorporate the Self-Defense Forces into the US military's global strategy. The China threat theory and the glorification of patriotism were used to manipulate public opinion, and the Abe administration was promoted as a "hawkish nobleman." However, Abe, who hid his anti-American armor beneath his pro-American cloak, eventually became a "dangerous presence" to the US, and his assassination and the dissolution of his faction were inevitable outcomes.
The Kōchikai consistently advocated "light armament and economic priority," and followed a political line based on modern rationality, albeit a pseudo-rational one. Suzuki Zenko's resistance was a symbol of this, and it was qualitatively different from the Seiwakai, which returned to communal norms. Mori and Abe's pro-American and anti-American stance was fundamentally different from the Kōchikai's stance toward the United States, clearly highlighting the dual structure of postwar Japanese politics.
This paper attempts to portray the "deep darkness" of postwar Japanese politics through this dualistic framework. The conflict between New Dealers and Wall Street was transplanted to postwar Japan, where it unfolded in a complicated form as the "conflict between the Kōchikai and Seiwakai parties." The demise of the Abe faction is positioned as a historical inevitability, the revival and subsequent collapse of communal norms. Japan's postwar drift has now reached a conclusion .