Introduction: The shadow of 150 years of British and American influence carved into Tokyo's landscape
Leaving Kudanshita Station on the subway, I headed toward Chidorigafuchi. This road, bustling with cherry blossom viewers in the spring, was silent on this winter morning. As I walked along the promenade along the moat, a huge stone building came into view: the British Embassy.
The site is over 40,000 square meters. No other foreign diplomatic mission occupies such a large space in a prime location in the city center.The British Embassy moved to this location in 1874, the 7th year of the Meiji era.
The building is located just 300 meters away from the Dajokan government office in Fukiage Gyoen, separated by a moat. Diplomatic records from the time show that high-ranking officials of the Meiji Restoration government frequently visited the British Embassy to negotiate foreign loans to be issued in London. According to the records, government officials made frequent trips through Hanzomon Gate to the British Embassy to discuss foreign loan issuances in the City of London. Tense traffic surrounding financial management in the early Meiji period was a daily occurrence here.
This scene eloquently tells us that the shadow of the Anglo-Saxons was already looming large behind the formation of the Meiji state.
In the second half of the 19th century, Britain, through Minister Harry Parkes, interpreter Ernest Satow, Jardine Matheson & Co., and Thomas Glover, pursued a strategy of incorporating Japan as an "outpost against Russia." The First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were closely linked to Britain's Eurasian strategy. It is no exaggeration to call them proxy wars.
The strategy of Britain and America toward Japan, aimed at containing Russia and targeting the Eurasian continent, began to take shape at the end of the Edo period, and eventually evolved into the Anglo-Saxon Alliance, aimed at containing Japan's invasion of China. This ultimately led to the war with the United States, which brought about the greatest disaster in Japanese history. After Japan's defeat, it was occupied by the United States.
Looking south from the Hanzo Moat of the Imperial Palace, you can see the U.S. Embassy on the plateau of Akasaka 1-Chome, overlooking the base of the triangle at the heart of Japanese politics : the Prime Minister's Official Residence, known as Nagatacho, the Diet, and the Kasumigaseki government district .
It's sometimes mocked as Japan's postwar "Government General's Office," but its presence, both topographically and symbolically, is undeniable. Even today, Japanese dignitaries make their way to the top of this hill, avoiding public attention. There's a credible theory that they chose to avoid public attention by building an underground passageway between the U.S. Embassy and the Prime Minister's residence and the adjacent hotel.
The Japan-US Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement merely replaced the military administration of the occupation period with a treaty format, and the core of Japan's security, diplomacy, and military remains embedded in the US strategic system. After the war, Japan did not start anew as a sovereign nation, but was repositioned as the "cornerstone" of the US strategy toward Eurasia.
Japan was an "outpost against Russia" established by Britain during the Meiji period.
Japan was the cornerstone of the US's postwar strategy toward Eurasia.
150 years of Anglo-American geopolitical continuity is quietly inscribed on the map of Tokyo.
■ A model for the US, UK and Anglo-Saxon strategies toward Japan
When considering modern Japan's foreign relations, Britain comes first.
To protect its Indian Empire, Britain established a military base in Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan and viewed Russia, which was moving south, as its greatest threat. Even though Britain controlled the Black Sea in the Crimean War and opened up the Chinese market in the Opium Wars, it still lacked the military strength to wage a land war against Russia in Asia. This is why the Japanese archipelago emerged geopolitically as a "key" to preventing Russia's expansion into the Pacific.
Through Minister Harry Parkes and Jardine, Matheson & Co., Britain incorporated Japan as a military outpost against Russia and became deeply involved in the finances and diplomacy of the Meiji government, which was rushing to build a military state. This led to the establishment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, and Japan came to play a part in the Anglo-Saxon strategy against Russia.
The Crimean War spread to the Russian Far East on the Pacific coast. In August 1854 , a combined British and French naval fleet laid siege to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, a Russian port and fortress on the Kamchatka Peninsula . The British and French forces launched a fierce bombardment and landed in September 1854, but suffered heavy casualties in the land battle and retreated.
While the war was going on, Russia had Vice Admiral Efim Putyatin negotiating with Japan for the opening of the country. Putyatin left Russia before the outbreak of war and arrived in Nagasaki in August 1853 to begin diplomatic negotiations. The Treaty of Peace and Amity between Japan and Russia was concluded in January 1855 .
Meanwhile, the British Navy's China and East India Squadron , led by Commander James Stirling, arrived in Nagasaki in September 1854. Although the Russian Putyatin fleet had already left Nagasaki, Stirling warned the shogunate that "Britain and Russia were at war, and Russia had territorial ambitions for Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands."
After the Treaty of Peace and Amity was signed in March 1854, the United States stayed in Hakodate ( Hakodate) , which had been opened by Commodore Perry 's fleet, for two weeks to monitor Russia, which was advancing into Hakodate in search of an ice-free port. At the time, Hakodate, Hokkaido, became the first place in Japan where the United States, Britain, and Russia faced off against each other, with Britain sending 13 ships, far more than any other country.
The United States was also strongly wary of Japan being incorporated into Russia's sphere of influence. Britain and the United States already shared the strategic goal of "containment of Russia" at the end of the Edo period.
Following Britain in the late 19th century , the United States also incorporated Japan as a cornerstone of the Eurasian-Pacific order in the 20th century . Japan has continued to be positioned in Anglo-Saxon geopolitical concepts for 150 years.
After the Russo-Japanese War, Britain strengthened its cooperation with the United States, and the Anglo-Saxon Alliance changed its positioning of Japan from an "ally to be utilized" to a "potential threat to be monitored."
■ American nationalism : exceptionalism, a sense of mission, and the idea of the frontier
So what kind of national vision did the United States, which succeeded Britain and would incorporate Japan more deeply and for a longer period of time, have? In order to understand the American strategy toward Japan, which sought to position Japan within the "Asia-Pacific order," let us first briefly look at the exceptionalism, sense of mission, and frontier ideas that underlie it.
Since its founding, America has cultivated a unique self-image. One is exceptionalism, which sees itself as an "exceptional nation" fulfilling a mission given to it by God. Another is Manifest Destiny, which saw America's expansion westward and its natural responsibility to civilize uncivilized lands . This slogan viewed American expansion as "civilization" and "divine mission," and justified the genocide of Native Americans and the invasion of the West.
Next came the belief that opening up frontiers would continually rejuvenate the nation. These became the underlying principles that guided American foreign policy. When the term " frontier " disappeared at the end of the 19th century , the slogan shifted to a westward expansion into the Pacific, and became a justification for US imperialist territorial expansion, such as the Spanish-American War, the Philippine-American War , and the annexation of Hawaii and Guam .
The Philippines, acquired in 1898 during the Spanish-American War, was not merely a colony but was strategically positioned as a bridgehead to the Chinese market. America considered the Pacific Ocean its own sea and placed expansion into Asia at the center of its national strategy.
■ The Chinese market as an “absolute interest”
The vast Chinese market was in sight. Secretary of State John Hay, who advocated the Open Door Policy of 1899-1900 , argued that "China's door must be open equally to all nations." This was central to America's long-term interests.
For the United States, China was a huge market that would determine the future of the United States, and an "absolute interest" that was positioned at the core of America's economic and strategic interests. The Open Door Policy was an attempt by the United States to prevent any great power from monopolizing the Chinese market and to maintain an environment in which American companies could enter in the name of free trade. While insisting on China's territorial integrity, the United States actually opened the Chinese market in an attempt to secure its own economic interests.
The Rockefeller Foundation, founded in 1913, supported this China strategy. The Foundation invested huge amounts of money in Chinese medical, educational, and research institutions, supporting institutions such as Tsinghua University, Yenching University, and Union Medical College. Asian studies scholar John Fairbank described America's China policy as a "cultural empire combining missionaries, foundations, universities, and corporations," and the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation are a prime example of this. America penetrated deeply into Chinese society not only through military power, but also through "soft power" in areas such as education, culture, and medicine.
Furthermore, the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), established in Honolulu in 1925, included intellectuals from the United States, China, and Japan, and functioned as an intellectual network supporting America's Asian policy.
David Rockefeller (1915-2017) wrote this in his memoirs, summarizing how important the United States was to the Chinese market .
"John Rockefeller (the oil tycoon and grandfather) dreamed of lighting all of China with his oil."
The seeds of conflict between Japan and the United States
Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War elevated it to the status of an independent empire, significantly changing Britain and the United States' view of Japan. After the Treaty of Versailles, Anglo-American cooperation became central to the international order, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was forced to dissolve as an "outdated bilateral military alliance," and Japan became isolated from the new Anglo-American order.
Following the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the Sino-Japanese Treaty on Manchuria (Manchuria Settlement Treaty) was signed in December 1905, which forced China to agree to the transfer of the Manchurian interests that had been handed over to Japan by Imperial Russia . Japan began to build interests in Manchuria. This was the first time that the interests of America and Japan came into direct conflict. For America, China was an "absolute interest," while for Japan, Manchuria was a "national lifeline." Conflict between the two was inevitable.
This took a decisive form in the Manchurian Incident. In September 1931, the Kwantung Army ignored government control and began acting independently, using its supreme command authority as a shield. Ishiwara Kanji, who led the operation, is said to have said, "The military decides the overall course of the nation." This method of creating fait accomplis and dragging the nation in a predetermined direction led to an expanded interpretation of the independence of supreme command authority, eventually paving the way for a system of national mobilization.
Japan consolidated its control over Manchuria, viewing it as a "lifeline." Manchuria was a source of resources, a destination for immigrants, and the foundation of Japan's total war system. Japan's ruling class believed that losing Manchuria would threaten the nation's existence, and they viewed Manchuria as a de facto "national living space." This perception was shared not only by the military, which began to run wild under the pretense of supreme command, but also by Japan's political and business circles.
The moment the Manchurian Incident broke out, the United States saw through the nature of Japan's "backbone." Japan's military was stronger than its government, and national decision-making was not unified. There was no civilian control, and the military acted on its own judgment and had the power to involve the nation. At this point, America's policy toward Japan clearly shifted from "cooperation" to "containment . "
■ America's view of Japan's pro-American collaborators
Japan-U.S. relations were not always one of conflict. President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) regarded Japan as "the only civilized nation in Asia on a par with the Western powers" and mediated the peace treaty that followed the Russo-Japanese War. During his time at Harvard, TR became friends with Kaneko Kentaro and Kabayama Aisuke, and in their letters he referred to Japan as "the only civilized power in Asia." To him, Japan was a stabilizing factor that would curb Russia's southward expansion and was expected to play a responsible role in maintaining international order.
However, TR's vision of Japan as a civilized nation had changed dramatically by the 1930s. With the rise of the military and the weakening of party politics, Japan lost its national unity, and diplomacy became paralyzed by the accumulation of military fait accomplis. In this climate, those who valued cooperation with the United States were pushed to the periphery as "outdated rationalists."
At the center of this movement were elites from the Imperial Court, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the aristocracy, and the genro (elder states). These men included Makino Nobuaki, Shidehara Kijuro, Yoshida Shigeru, Konoe Fumimaro, Tokugawa Ietada, Matsudaira Tsuneo, and Kabayama Aisuke. All of them had studied in Europe and the United States, were fluent in English, and shared an affinity for the ideals of the Washington System, the international order that existed in East Asia and the Pacific from the end of World War I until the early 1930s. They intuitively believed that the military's rampage would lead the nation to ruin.
Joseph Grew, who took up his post as U.S. Ambassador to Japan in 1932, built a deep relationship of trust with these "sensible voices" in Japan. Grew understood Japanese society and accurately grasped the dangers of the military. He meticulously recorded his meetings with Konoe, Yoshida, Makino, and others in his diary, and repeatedly reported to Washington that "voices of reason still exist in Japan."
The friendships he had built with Kaneko Kentaro and Kabayama Aisuke during his time with the TR resurfaced here, but the efforts of those in favor of cooperation with the United States were crushed by the accumulation of fait accomplis within the military, namely the recognition of Manchukuo in the 1930s , withdrawal from the League of Nations, the North China Incident, and the all-out Sino-Japanese War .
The military insisted that "the military decides the general course of the nation," and diplomacy played a secondary role in explaining the situation. Shidehara's diplomacy was denounced as "weak," Makino was attacked as "a mastermind behind the Imperial Court," and Yoshida was put under surveillance as a "pro-Anglo-American."
They understood better than anyone that the core of the nation was collapsing. However, that understanding did not translate into political power. The military used its supreme command authority to oppress party politics and even began to exert influence over the Imperial Court. Although pro-American collaborators were at the heart of the nation, they had no power to change the country's course. They were plagued by a sense of powerlessness.
Still, they did not abandon this last possibility. They were driven by the conviction that a conflict with America would mean Japan's downfall. Konoe sought a Japan-US summit, Yoshida continued to secretly exchange views with Grew, and Makino repeatedly urged the Emperor to restrain the military's rampage.
They were attacked by the military as "pro-Anglo-American" and "traitors," but still worked hard to avoid a breakdown in Japan-US relations.
The struggle of those in favor of cooperation with the United States was not simply a diplomatic conflict , but a battle over "what kind of nation Japan should continue to be." The military envisioned "Japan as a continental nation," while the cooperation faction envisioned "Japan as a maritime nation . "
In the eyes of U.S. Ambassador Grew, Japan was a fragile entity with a split spine and an unstable national will. The military stood above the state, the government hid in its shadow, and the emperor was at the center of the fluctuating situation. At the same time, however, the "moderates" such as Makino, Yoshida, and Konoe were the last pillars barely supporting the frayed spine. Japan appeared to Grew as a nation teetering between collapse and rationality, on the brink of collapse.
■ Cooperative Exceptionalism: FDR and the New Dealers' Vision of International Order
Apart from its aggressive aspects, there was also a trend to transform American exceptionalism into "international cooperation." Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) and the New Dealers were at the center of this trend. The New Dealers played a key role in promoting the occupation policy of Japan after the war.
FDR advocated the "Four Freedoms" and sought to position America's mission not as an expansionist hegemon, but as a stabilizing global order and maintaining peace. The Atlantic Charter was an international declaration of this ideal and a symbol of the "cooperative exceptionalism" that led to the postwar United Nations Charter. The internationalism shared by Secretary of State Hull, Harry Hopkins, and Republican Wilkie, who worked hard to implement the New Deal , was close to the social democratic idea of providing American power as a public good.
The Bretton Woods system also envisioned a Keynesian international economic order and established an institutional framework to prevent a recurrence of the Great Depression, a system that again reflected FDR's cooperationism.
However, this trend rapidly receded with the death of FDR in April 1945. The Truman administration that succeeded him steered the country toward building a Cold War system premised on confrontation with the Soviet Union, and exceptionalism was once again reclaimed as an aggressive logic that justified "containment" and military superiority.
The United Nations envisioned by FDR became a stage for conflict rather than cooperation, and the Security Council became dysfunctional due to its veto power. The failure of FDR's international cooperation was a major turning point in world history. The world began to move toward "another path" different from the order envisioned by FDR .
After New Dealer Franklin Roosevelt was elected president in 1932, major Wall Street financial institutions began plotting a coup. Journalist Paul French, who learned of the plot, received testimony from the coup plotters that "a fascist government is necessary to protect the nation from communism."
Even within the Democratic Party, there were many lawmakers who opposed FDR's New Deal policies. The lawmakers who founded the American Freedom League were said to have received funding from large corporations and wealthy individuals . The coup plot was thwarted by retired Marine Major General Smedley Butler and others.
The New Dealers, who sought to promote social democratic policies, were labeled communists by Wall Street and monopoly capital, and by August 1945, FDR had suddenly died, leaving them with no place to thrive within the United States. The defeated Imperial Japan seemed like the perfect testing ground for democratization.
The New Dealers came to Japan as the main force in promoting reform during the occupation , but their activities were restricted from the start. Under the Truman administration, FDR's vision of democratization, social reform, and Asian cooperation was pushed back, and Japan was restructured as a bulwark against communism.
Main references
Ernest Satow, "The Meiji Restoration as Seen by a Diplomat," Iwanami Bunko
Masaru Sasaki, "Diplomacy and the Opening of the Country at the End of the Tokugawa Shogunate,
" Yoshikawa Kobunkan Soki Watanabe, "The Meiji Restoration as Seen by a British Journalist," Soshisha
Ian Nish, "The History of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Chuokoron-Shinsha
Okabe Makio, "Crimean War," Kodansha Gendai Shinsho
Makoto Saito, "The Genealogy of American Exceptionalism," University of Tokyo Press;
Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Frontier in American History";
Anders Stephanson, "Manifest Destiny"
Yuzo Kato, "American Policy Toward China," University of Tokyo Press
John King Fairbank, "The United States and China"
David Rockefeller, "Dr. Rockefeller's Memoirs," Nihon Keizai Shimbun
Ryuji Hattori, "The Washington System," Kodansha Academic Library
Akira Irie, "The American Century," Misuzu Shobo Tsuyoshi
Hara, "The Manchurian Incident," Chuokoron
Shinsho Kazutoshi Hando, "Showa History," Heibonsha
Joseph Grew, "Ten Years in Japan," Chuokoron-Shinsha
Steve Kemper, "Our Man in Tokyo"
Shigeru Yoshida, "Ten Years of Reminiscence," Chuokoron-Shinsha
Nobuaki Makino, "The Diary of Nobuaki Makino," Iwanami Shoten
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Age of Roosevelt," Misuzu Shobo;
Frank Costigliola, "Roosevelt's Lost Alliances";
Makoto Saito, "The New Deal and American Politics," Iwanami Shoten