１：Japan is doomed—Soseki's single statement illuminates 150 years of structural collapse.
Natsume Soseki's novel "Sanshiro" contains a shocking line. A bearded man whom the protagonist encounters on a train on his way to Tokyo utters this:
"(Japan) is doomed."
Those words were not spoken out of emotion, but as a result of observation. Contrary to the vibrant energy of the "Russo-Japanese victory" that surfaced in the new Meiji era, Soseki must have quietly observed the structural fragility lurking beneath the surface.
Less than 40 years later, Japan was destroyed once. However, Soseki's words illuminate not only the pre-war catastrophe, but also the "second destruction" currently underway, which is perhaps closer to Soseki's diagnosis.
The collapse of pre-war Japan was rapid. However, what is important here is the "150-year structure" that produced it.
The Meiji state was established with the British strategy absorbed by the Iwakura Mission in London as its framework. From the moment the Meiji state was established by imitating the strategy of the British Empire, the framework of a modern emperor system and military state , a foreign policy prioritizing the containment of Russia in cooperation with Britain , and a bureaucratic rule and centralized power that despised the people and suppressed the masses was already solidified. This framework led to the rapid catastrophe between 1931 and 1945.
The collapse of postwar Japan was of a completely different nature. The essence of the US and UK occupation of Japan was to "disarm Japan and never again pose a threat." "Building a peaceful nation centered on a new constitution" was also within the framework of US and UK policy toward Japan. However, 30 years later, Japan achieved astonishing economic success, became euphoric with praise as "Japan as No. 1," and once again challenged the US and Europe.
Japan's decline since the collapse of the bubble economy has been progressing in ways that are not clearly visible, deep within its society. It is heading towards a slow structural collapse. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bubble, Japan has been in a state of being "kept alive, yet not truly alive." The economy is exhausted and emaciated, society is in decline and has lost its vitality, politics is rigid, and imagination for the future has been stifled.
Meanwhile, the shape of the nation is changing in a different direction. A new Joint Operations Command has been established within the Self-Defense Forces. Under the pretext that its operations will proceed in close cooperation with U.S. forces in Japan, the Self-Defense Forces have effectively come under the command of the U.S. military. And Japan has effectively joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Defense spending has doubled, long-range missiles are being deployed, and new missile bases targeting China have been established in the southwestern islands of the East China Sea. The outline of the nation is beginning to take on a shadow that is clearly different from that of post-war Japan.
When the Chinese government says that "Japan is heading towards a new form of militarism," it can be understood not merely as political rhetoric, but as one external perspective on the structural changes occurring in Japan.
The collapse of pre-war Japan was the primary consequence of the structural flaws of the Meiji state. The quiet decline of post-war Japan since the bubble economy is the second consequence. And the current military reorganization is emerging as the third consequence.
Soseki's "It will perish" continues to resonate quietly, yet surely, within the 150-year timeframe.
This signifies "two destructions" that spanned 150 years from the Meiji era to the present day. The resonance of this phrase is all too fitting for the current landscape of Japan.
２：The fall of Imperial Japan was inevitable.
Soseki's prophecy that "Japan will perish" forms the core of my essay, "Japan as a Chimera." Let's delve deeper into its meaning.
■Soseki's Thought: A Critique of the Spiritual Foundation of the Emperor's Prerogatives
Natsume Soseki was a thinker who, earlier, more sharply, and in the most "dangerous way," grasped the core of modern Japan. This danger stemmed from the clash between the "depth of the people" he experienced in Britain and the "spiritual structure of the national polity" upon which the Meiji state relied.
What Soseki witnessed in Britain in the early 1900s, the mecca of the socialist movement, was not the steam engine, the grandeur of the empire, or the splendor of the royal family. It was the very essence of modernity: the people supporting the nation . Parliament, self-governance, deliberation, the public sphere, the labor movement—these are the spiritual foundations of the modern state, where citizens move the nation according to their own will.
Soseki understood this as "the depth of civilization." After returning to Japan, he witnessed the fervor of victory in the Russo-Japanese War that swept across the archipelago, and intuitively sensed the "emptiness" beneath it. Japan lacked the depth of its people that he had seen in Britain. Rather than discussion creating the atmosphere, the atmosphere was crushing the discussion.
The parliamentary system is merely a formality; there is no autonomy, individuals are not independent, and the public sphere does not monitor those in power.
Soseki criticized this mental structure in the form of literature. The line "Japan is doomed," which he had the bearded man say in "Sanshiro," is not mere irony. It is a civilized diagnosis that sees through Japan's mental structure, which does not meet the conditions of a modern nation-state— blind obedience to authority, lack of autonomy, and absence of a public sphere .
Sanshiro's reply, "In Kyushu and Kumamoto, you'd be treated as a traitor," sharply criticizes the community's atmosphere of excluding dissenting opinions. This is a critique of the very mental structure that underpins absolute obedience to the Emperor's prerogatives.
The Meiji state was established around the "national polity," which considered the Emperor as the source of governing power. Its spiritual foundation consisted of " blind obedience to authority, a patriarchal order, conformity pressure within village communities, and an ethic that prioritized the family over the individual, and the state over the family ."
The "depth of the people" that Soseki witnessed in Britain fundamentally clashes with the mental structure of this national polity. In Britain, individuals are independent, criticize authority, engage in discussions in the public sphere, and monitor the state. In Japan, individuals are treated as part of the family, obey authority, read the atmosphere, and do not question the state.
Soseki brought this conflict back to Japan in the form of literature and lectures. In his lecture "The Modernization of Japan," he clearly stated that Japan's modernization was externally driven and lacked a strong spiritual foundation . In his lecture "My Individualism," he urged people to live self-centeredly rather than others-centeredly , and presented individual independence as a condition for modernity .
These lectures contained dangerous content that shook the very foundations of the Meiji state. If Soseki had lived until the 1930s, his ideas would likely have been exposed as "dangerous liberal thought," similar to those of Hajime Kawakami, Jun Tosaka, and Kiyoshi Miki.
However, Soseki passed away in 1916. The Peace Preservation Law was enacted in 1925, and the suppression of thought intensified in the 1930s.
Soseki passed away before the times recognized the danger and could quell it. Therefore, while Soseki's criticism was "on the edge," it never came to light.
Soseki criticized the very mental structure that underpinned absolute obedience to the Emperor's prerogatives. However, because he did so in the form of literature, without turning his ideas into a political movement, and without outwardly rejecting the national polity itself, he was spared the target of the Peace Preservation Law. Soseki was the first to recognize the dangers of modern Japan, but he passed away quietly before the times could eliminate those dangers.
Soseki's experiences in Britain clashed head-on with the psyche of modern Japan. The sparks of that clash were preserved in the form of literature. These include "It will perish" in Sanshiro, "Self-centeredness" in My Individualism, and "Superficial modernization" in Modern Japan's Civilization.
Soseki was the first to recognize the contradictions of modern Japan, and his critique shines as a critique of the spiritual foundation of the Emperor's prerogatives.
■The fatal contradiction of "Japanese spirit, Western learning" and the beginnings of its downfall
The "depth of the people" that Soseki witnessed in Britain fundamentally clashed with the mental structure of the Meiji state. Behind this clash lay a fatal contradiction inherent in the ideology of the Meiji system itself: the concept of "Japanese spirit, Western learning ."
The phrase "Japanese spirit, Western learning" was not an ideal of modernization, but rather a slogan indicating that "modernization of Japan is impossible." Western learning refers not only to the Industrial Revolution and technological innovation, but also to the bourgeois revolution, parliamentary sovereignty, autonomy, the public sphere, and the labor movement—modern civil society itself. This is incompatible with the "Japanese spirit" that encompasses Confucian social hierarchy, Bushido-like loyalty ethics, patriarchy, village communities, and the emperor-centered principle of integration.
As will be detailed later, the Meiji Restoration was fundamentally an "opening of the country for the purpose of expelling foreigners," and its true intention was to eliminate Western modern political ideologies—bourgeois revolution, parliamentary sovereignty, and individual autonomy. Modernization was a facade, and the nation's purpose was "the construction of an empire to rival the West," making war with the United States and Great Britain inevitable.
Therefore, the Meiji state imported not the spirit of modernity, but only the tools of modernity—the art of Japanese-style imperial governance.
Railways, warships, bureaucracy, constitutions, and parliaments—these are the outward forms of modernity, while the depth of the people—the maturity of civil society— that should lie within them was completely excluded.
This structural flaw created a deep disconnect between the spirit of modernity that Soseki witnessed in Britain and the spiritual structure of Japan's national identity.
Soseki exposed this disconnect through literature. In "Sanshiro," the line "Japan will perish" reveals that the Meiji system's ideology of "Japanese spirit, Western learning" was a fatal contradiction that prevented it from meeting the conditions of a modern nation.
Soseki understood that the mental structure of the Meiji state contained the seeds of its own downfall .
Japan, without experiencing a bourgeois revolution, based its spiritual foundation on the Emperor's prerogatives, considered blind obedience to authority a virtue, lacked autonomy, had no public sphere, allowed public opinion to dominate discussions, and viewed dissent as treason . Yet , it still claimed to be a "modern nation."
This contradiction made the defeat and collapse of 1945 inevitable.
Having witnessed the spirit of modernity in Britain, Soseki was the first to understand that Japanese modernity was a "disguise."
Soseki died in 1916, and because the times changed before his ideas could develop into a movement, he was never subjected to prosecution under the Public Security Preservation Law.
Soseki was the first to recognize the contradictions of modern Japan. And these contradictions, as the fatal contradiction of "Japanese spirit, Western learning," did not become the ethos of modern Japan, but were embedded in Japanese history as the seeds of its downfall.
The collapse of 1945 was the result of a rupture—specifically, the inability to withstand the friction between the "depth of the citizenry" that Sōseki had witnessed in Britain and the "spirit of modernity" that Japan had rejected.
Sōseki’s critique of civilization had predicted, half a century in advance, the inevitable catastrophe wrought by the Meiji regime’s superficial modernization.
In 1912, he spoke as follows at the Gakushūin—a talk known as the "My Individualism" lecture:
"Britain is a nation that deeply cherishes freedom. Yet, for all its love of liberty, there is no country more orderly than Britain... There is likely no other place in the world that is simultaneously so free and so well-ordered; Japan cannot even begin to compare. However, their freedom is not merely freedom. From childhood, they receive a social education that teaches them to respect the freedom of others just as they cherish their own. Consequently, the concept of duty is inextricably linked to their freedom. Nelson’s famous words—'England expects every man to do his duty'—were not merely a remark for the moment; they reflect a deeply rooted philosophy that has evolved in tandem with their liberty... When they have grievances, they often stage demonstrations. Yet the government never interferes officiously; it simply leaves them be. In return, the protesters understand the boundaries well and do not engage in reckless acts that would cause undue trouble for the government."
３：Another Meiji Era: Saigo and Itagaki as Lost Possibilities
The Meiji state advanced modernization by upholding a cause that only the Japanese could understand. This national ideology, supported by the unique spiritual structure of the Emperor system, exerted strong force in domestic unity, but failed to present universal values to the international community. Japan could establish inward-looking causes such as "national polity" and "imperial history," but it could not translate them into a universal logic that foreigners could understand.
This flaw is deeply rooted in the formation process of the Meiji state. Iwakura, Okubo, and Yamagata absorbed the colonial imperialist model of a state prioritizing foreign policy and military power during their time in Europe and America, which lacked an ideological foundation based on universal values. The state they built was based on spiritual unity centered on the Emperor and centralized rule by the bureaucracy and military, and lacked the language to articulate their ideals to the international community.
As a result, Japan was unable to explain to the world "why it was fighting." The First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian Incident, and the Pacific War were all justified domestically with spiritual arguments such as "preserving the national polity" and "the cause of the Imperial nation," but there was no ideology that could be presented to the outside world as a universal value. Japan's cause was only understood within the Japanese people, and it had no words to express to the international community.
In November 1943, the Tojo cabinet held the "Greater East Asia Conference," inviting leaders from Manchukuo, the Wang Jingwei regime in Nanjing, and other Japanese puppet regimes such as the Philippines. The "Greater East Asia Joint Declaration," issued amidst an unfavorable war situation , proclaimed the coexistence and co-prosperity of Asian nations and their independence, attempting to justify the war against the United States and Great Britain. However, it was nothing more than a meaningless imitation.
In response, the United States and Great Britain had already championed "universal values" in the early stages of World War II and produced a prototype for the UN Charter.
In August 1941, the Atlantic Charter, issued by Roosevelt and Churchill, clearly articulated ideals such as non-expansion of territory, national self-determination, freedom of political choice, and freedom of the seas, presenting the post-war world order as a system of universal values. This was not merely a war objective, but a "declaration of values" directed at the international community, representing a nation with a language to speak to the world.
This difference was decisive. The United States and Great Britain increased the number of supporting nations by upholding universal values, and formed the broad international framework of the Allied Powers (United Nations). Japan, remaining confined to its own spiritual philosophy, failed to present its ideals to the world, nor was it able to increase its allies, ultimately becoming isolated. Japan's declaration of war was directed at the United States and Great Britain, but by the end of the war, the number of victorious nations that signed the instrument of surrender had increased to nine. As a nation that failed to present universal values, Japan was forced to fight a lonely battle in the international community.
This structural flaw was already embedded at the very moment the Meiji state was established. Had Saigo and Itagaki's vision of "another Meiji" been realized, Japan might have developed into a nation based on popular autonomy and universal values. However, that possibility was crushed by the political forgery of the argument for invading Korea, and the imperial military state became fixed as the backbone of modern Japan. As a result, Japan headed towards two collapses without having a voice to speak to the world.
What is called the "Meiji state" is merely one option among many, built upon the framework of the imperialist state model—prioritizing foreign policy, centralization, bureaucratic rule, and militarization—that Iwakura Tomomi, Okubo Toshimichi, and Yamagata Aritomo absorbed in Europe and America. What they saw was a system for empires to control the world, not domestic values such as national autonomy or local self-governance. The Meiji state was shaped according to that perspective.
However, in the shadows, another Meiji era certainly existed. The nation envisioned by Saigo Takamori and Itagaki Taisuke was headed in a completely different direction. It was based on the self-governance of the people, respected local voices, valued domestic affairs, and emphasized sincerity in foreign policy to avoid war. Rather than directing the power of the state outward, it prioritized improving the lives and ethics within the nation—a quiet but sure path to modernization.
However, this "alternative Meiji" was erased by the political fabrication of the argument for invading Korea. Saigo was not belligerent, and rather tried to avoid war, yet he was portrayed as a "military adventurist." As Saigo himself said, "If I went, I would be killed," his plan was a self-sacrificing diplomacy to avoid war. Nevertheless, the Meiji government created the label of "advocating for invading Korea" to eliminate Saigo and banished him from the center of politics.
Itagaki Taisuke also advocated for civil rights and local autonomy, but he was an inconvenient figure for the Meiji government, which aspired to a bureaucratic state. His ideas were pushed to the periphery of the "civil rights movement" and kept away from the forefront of shaping the framework of the nation.
Thus, Japan began its journey not as a nation of people governed by its own people, but as a state under an emperor and military system.
This structure was further strengthened by Yamagata Aritomo's military system and the Ministry of Home Affairs' control, and the nation proceeded through modernity confined to its own unique spiritualism, unable to present "universal values." Japan could uphold domestic ideals such as "national polity" and "imperial history," but it could not translate them into universal values for the international community. A nation without a language to communicate with the world eventually heads towards isolation.
Had Saigo and Itagaki's vision of "another Meiji" been realized, Japan might have been a completely different country. A nation based on national autonomy and local self-governance could have avoided the rigidity of bureaucratic rule, pursued modernization with an emphasis on domestic affairs, and spoken of universal values to the international community. A diplomacy that avoided war might have broken the chain of prioritizing foreign policy that led to the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian War, and the Pacific War.
Japan's decline 150 years later began the moment this "alternative Meiji era" was crushed. The defeat in the war solidified the chains of American and British Anglo-Saxon rule. The lost potential quietly vanished into history, but its shadow still lingers beneath the surface of our society.
４：Japanese militarism will not die.
According to a statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Chinese Foreign Minister and Politburo member Wang Yi visited South Korea on the 20th and met with National Security Advisor Wei Shengluo, stating, "We should be wary of the words and actions of Japanese right-wing forces that are trying to reverse history. We will never allow a revival of Japanese militarism."
China has recently criticized the Sanae Takaichi administration, which is strengthening its defense capabilities, as a "new type of militarism," and has repeatedly criticized Japan in meetings with other countries and at international conferences. Both China and South Korea strongly protested the visit of Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and others to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, and Wang's actions appear to have been a way of seeking Wei's agreement on their concerns about Japan.
Recent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administrations have abandoned the ideal of "building a peaceful nation," which should be considered the starting point of postwar Japan, through measures such as a dramatic increase in defense spending, the de facto acceptance of preemptive strikes (abandoning the principle of exclusively defensive defense), and the lifting of the arms export ban. It is undoubtedly related to the fact that Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who also served as the Chinese ambassador to Japan, is calling for the "revival of Japanese militarism," since the Koizumi administration, when the nationalist Seiwakai faction became the mainstream of the LDP. Wang Yi, who is also extremely fluent in Japanese, served as ambassador to Japan from 2004 to 2007, a period that spanned the Koizumi administration and the first Abe administration, and his inclination towards a return to the prewar era was evident in the Abe cabinet's "break from the postwar regime."
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who considers herself a favorite disciple of Shinzo Abe, has repeatedly expressed a historical view that denies responsibility for aggression and colonial rule, claiming that World War II was fought in self-defense. In October 1994, during her first term in office, Takaichi appealed to then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in the House of Representatives Budget Committee, saying, "I can't have you apologizing on behalf of Japan without my consent." In his policy speech in July of the same year, Murayama stated that Japan's acts of aggression and colonial rule against Asian countries had caused unbearable suffering and sorrow, and that he would "stand on deep reflection." Takaichi criticized this, saying that he had "recognized it as aggression without national debate."